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		<title>What is the meaning of “undertaking” and “substantially the whole undertaking” under the Companies Act?</title>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>‘Undertaking shall mean an undertaking in which the investment of the company exceeds …..’ is the explanation in the Companies Act, 2013 [Cos Act]. This is the classic style of the legislature, where the lawmaker does not define the core term [in this case, the explanation does not explain the meaning of the term “undertaking”]. [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://mmjc.in/what-is-the-meaning-of-undertaking-and-substantially-the-whole-undertaking-under-the-companies-act/">What is the meaning of “undertaking” and “substantially the whole undertaking” under the Companies Act?</a> first appeared on <a href="https://mmjc.in">MMJC</a>.</p>]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p class="wp-block-paragraph">‘Undertaking shall mean an undertaking in which the investment of the company exceeds …..’ is the explanation in the Companies Act, 2013 [Cos Act]. This is the classic style of the legislature, where the lawmaker does not define the core term [in this case, the explanation does not explain the meaning of the term “undertaking”]. Probably, the lawmaker assumes that readers know the meaning of “undertaking”, or the lawmaker chooses to remain non-prescriptive about the core concept and merely prescribes that the said undertaking will be treated as an undertaking for the purposes of this provision if the investment of the company in such undertaking exceeds the threshold explained in that explanation. However, the core question that has kept haunting stakeholders is: what is an undertaking?</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">There have been multiple pronouncements dealing with questions such as: what is an undertaking? What is the whole or substantially the whole of an undertaking? What is disposal of an undertaking? Whether a closed unit is an undertaking? Whether an asset is an undertaking? However, the core issue that first needs to be understood is what constitutes an undertaking, followed by the meaning of “substantially the whole of an undertaking”.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>What is undertaking?</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The erstwhile Companies Act, 1956 had no definition or even an explanation of what constitutes an undertaking. However, this subject came before the judiciary on multiple occasions for interpretation. Depending upon the background of each case, the judiciary gave its verdict on whether the thing being sold or disposed of was an undertaking. This concept was initially discussed in the context of the Industrial Disputes Act. From this context, the issues that arise for deliberation are:</p>



<ol class="wp-block-list">
<li>Whether the board is disposing of asset or undertaking?</li>



<li>If what is proposed to be disposed of is some assets, whether it is disposal of whole or substantially the whole of the undertaking or not?</li>
</ol>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Landmark Judicial view</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">There are many pronouncements on what is treated as an undertaking. Some landmark judicial views are set out below:</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>R.C. Cooper v. Union of India, [1970] 40 Comp Cas 325 (SC)</em>, the learned judge observed that the undertaking meant the entire organisation. It was observed by the learned judge, at page 417, that the undertaking was an amalgam of all ingredients of property and was not capable of being dismembered. It was further held on this aspect as under:</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>&#8220;In reality the undertaking is a complete and complex weft and the various types of business and assets are threads which cannot be taken apart from the weft.&#8221;</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Sree Yellamma (Karnataka HC)</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>Undertaking was not, in its real meaning, anything which may be described as a tangible piece of property like land, machinery or the equipment; it is in actual effect an activity of man which in commercial or business parlance means an activity engaged in with a view to earn profit. Property, moveable or immoveable, used in the course of or for the purpose of such business can more accurately be described as the tools of business or undertaking, i.e. things or articles which are necessarily to be used to keep the undertaking going or to assist the carrying on of the activities leading to the earning of profits.”</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>P.S. Offshore Case</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">“18. In my judgment, the expression “undertaking” used in this section is liable to be interpreted to mean “the unit”, the business as a going concern, the activity of the company duly integrated with all its components in the form of assets and not merely some asset of the undertaking. Having regard to the object of the provision, it can, at the most, embrace within it all the assets of the business as a unit or practically all such constituents.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">If the question arises as to whether the major capital assets of the company constitute the undertaking of the company while examining the authority of the board to dispose of the same without the authority of the general body, the test to be applied would be to see whether the business of the company could be carried on effectively even after disposal of the assets in question or whether the mere husk of the undertaking would remain after disposal of the assets? The test to be applied would be to see whether the capital assets to be disposed of constitute substantially the bulk of the assets so as to constitute the integral part of the undertaking itself in the practical sense of the term.”</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Companies law, in all its versions, has had a very clear-cut bifurcation of powers between the Board and shareholders. The power to sell, lease or dispose of an undertaking, either wholly or substantially as a whole, required prior consent of the shareholders of the company. The law was, and is, very clear that for selling or leasing assets, the Board does not need the consent of shareholders; it is within its powers. However, for selling, leasing or disposing of an undertaking, the Board needs the prior consent of the shareholders.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Litmus test</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Though the Companies Act does not expressly define and differentiate the terms “asset” and “undertaking”, it can be inferred from the usage of these expressions in the Companies Act, together with judicial pronouncements, that there is a legislative intent to give different meanings to both terms.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">While ‘asset’ would generally mean a property of the Company whether moveable or immoveable and may or may not be used to generate revenue, an ‘undertaking’ of a company could be referred to as something that would constitute an integral part of a company and would be used as a tool for business purpose thereby contributing to the Company’s generation of revenue and/or earning of profits.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">When the Board is disposing of certain assets of the company, the test to be applied is whether the business of the company could be carried on effectively even after disposal of the assets in question, or whether only the mere husk of the undertaking would remain after disposal of those assets.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Closed Unit Vs. Running Unit</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In Pramod Kumar Mittal and in PS Offshore (supra), one common question was whether a closed factory, or an undertaking not deployed for running the business, is treated as an undertaking under the Cos Act. After reading both judgments, it emerges that the answer depends on the context and facts of the case. For example, in PS Offshore, the company had three ships, and one ship was newly purchased but, due to the business situation, was not deployed in the business. Whether disposal of a newly acquired ship not put to use in the business would require shareholder approval was the question. The Court clearly held that whether the undertaking is generating revenue or not is not determinative. The logic in PS Offshore appears to be that even if the newly acquired ship was not put to use, it could have been put to use at any time; therefore, whether the business is being carried on today should not be the parameter. However, in Pramod Kumar Mittal, the Court held that since the factory proposed to be disposed of was a closed unit, it did not require shareholder approval. The context in that case, however, was different. The petition was related to oppression and mismanagement, and the High Court supplanted the Board with a court-appointed Committee of Management, which subsequently sold a company unit to settle creditor dues. The Court held that Section 293 does not apply to such a sale, as the statutory requirement for shareholder approval governs voluntary actions by a Board, not decisions executed by a court-appointed committee. Therefore, it emerges that if the underlying assets, taken together, constitute an undertaking, whether it is currently running as a business and the proximity and probability of restarting that business by an acquirer would be subjective parameters to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis to decide whether shareholder consent is required in a particular matter.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Meaning of Substantially the Whole [before 2013]</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In PS Offshore, one more subject came for discussion – whether disposal of 1 ship out of 3 ships would be considered as disposal of substantially the whole of the undertaking or not? To that court opined that &#8211;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">“If the question arises as to whether the major capital assets of the company constitute the undertaking of the company while examining the authority of the board to dispose of the same without the authority of the general body, the test to be applied would be to see whether the business of the company could be carried on effectively even after disposal of the assets in question or whether the mere husk of the undertaking would remain after disposal of the assets?”</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Here the word ‘substantial’ was also interpreted by the court with similar parameter like those applied for treating something as undertaking i.e. whether after disposal of this part of undertaking whether the rest of the undertaking is becoming husk. Since after disposing off 1 ship still company had other 2 ships, disposal of one ship does not fall under the term ‘substantially the whole’ was the view taken by Bombay High court.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>JJ Irani Committee Recommendation</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Probably, this and similar cases contributed to the deliberations of the JJ Irani Committee, constituted in 2004 to overhaul the Cos Act. The Irani Committee felt that:</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Section 293 of the present Act “should be reviewed and it should be provided that the consent of the shareholders should be through a special resolution for certain items such as those presently mentioned in 293 (1) (a), (c) and (d) of the present Act. Shareholders’ approval should be required for sale of whole or substantially whole of the undertaking in that financial year. “whole or substantially whole” should mean 20% of the total assets of the company.”</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The JJ Irani Committee did not change the meaning of the term “undertaking”. It merely recommended defining “whole or substantially whole” as 20% of the total assets of the company.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">So, committee’s recommendation was simple. While adopting explanation, it was split into 2 parts. What is whole undertaking and what is substantially the whole undertaking. Which reads as follows</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>Explanation.—For the purposes of this clause,—</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>(i)&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &#8220;undertaking&#8221; shall mean an undertaking in which the investment of the company exceeds twenty per cent of its net worth as per the audited balance sheet of the preceding financial&nbsp; year or an undertaking which generates twenty per cent of the total income of the company during the previous financial year;</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>(ii)&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; the expression &#8220;substantially the whole of the undertaking&#8221; in any financial year shall mean twenty per cent or more of the value of the undertaking as per the audited balance sheet of the preceding financial year;</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This explanation doesn’t define what is undertaking but clarifies that undertaking in which investment of the company exceeds 20% of its net worth or which generates more than 20% of the total income will require compliance of section 180(1)(a).</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">And substantially the whole undertaking would mean “20% or more of the value of undertaking as per audited balance sheet of preceding financial year”. This was a significant departure from PS Offshore case.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">As per the new explanation, if the proposed disposal amounts to 20% or more of the value of the undertaking as per the audited balance sheet of the preceding financial year, it will be treated as a sale, lease or disposal of substantially the whole of the undertaking requiring shareholder approval. This seems to be a rule-based explanation, and the principle-based view taken in PS Offshore may not be relevant here onwards. If PS Offshore were to arise today, since the company was in the shipping business, and if the value of the third ship was more than 20% of the value of the undertaking, it would require compliance with section 180.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong><em>Madhukar Anantrao Pathak v MPTA Ltd</em></strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In this context, there is recent NCLT/ NCLAT pronouncement where company was in business of advisory and coaching and it had a bungalow as a property. And company was trying to dispose of that bungalow, and question was whether this will require shareholder approval or not, to which NCLAT said that bungalow is not an undertaking, and it will not require approval of shareholders. It is not clear whether company had any business / undertaking and whether bungalow was part of that business / undertaking or not? If there is no business unit/ undertaking in the company OR if bungalow is not part of the business unit/ undertaking compliance of section 180 would not be required, however, had appellant proved that there was a undertaking and bungalow was part of the undertaking which is constituting more than 20% of value of undertaking probable the conclusion can be different. There are many old companies who have huge land parcel, and they have business unit separately functioning and many times they take a view that asset which is being disposed of is not part of undertaking and therefore will not require compliance of new framework prescribed under section 180. And this view looks perfectly fine.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>What if company is in service or investment or lending business</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Most of the pronouncements discussed above, apart from PS Offshore and Madhukar Pathak, relate to manufacturing companies. For a service company, a trading company, or a lending or investment company, the meaning of a business unit needs to be looked at differently. As observed in all landmark pronouncements, it is not about a factory or a unit alone; an undertaking is a business unit.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">What is a business unit for the service industry? Is it the office? Staff? Customer contracts? IT infrastructure? Intellectual property? A business vertical? A business vertical can be an undertaking, and even intellectual property can constitute substantially the whole of an undertaking.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">What is business UNIT For investment company? because their business is to invest in other companies or properties and their earnings is either from its dividend/ interest OR in the form of profit on sell. Whether disposing off investment will be a sale of substantially whole of undertaking? We have seen in <em>Brooke Bond India Ltd.</em> v <em>U B Ltd</em> and Gujrat NRE Mineral Resources Ltd. v SEBI the court or adjudicating authorities have taken a view that investment in other company is not an undertaking. However, both these companies were operating cum investment companies i.e. a dual-purpose entity that actively runs its own core commercial business operations while simultaneously holding and managing a portfolio of investments in other companies. It generates revenue both from its direct business activities and from investment returns like dividends, interest, or capital gains. Had this case been of pure investment holding company (sole or primary business is to hold, manage, and trade financial assets and investments (such as shares, bonds, or mutual funds) for capital appreciation and income) probably answer can be different particularly when value of investment which is getting sold is more than 20% of its net worth!</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">If the business is e-commerce, what is the business unit? Is it the platform? Is it the dark stores? If the company is not selling its platform but is selling only dark stores to subsidiaries, is it a sale of a substantial undertaking if the value exceeds the threshold? Since the whole undertaking is not being sold, but what is being transferred or disposed of exceeds 20% of the value of the undertaking, it would still require shareholder approval.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Similarly, for a non-banking finance company engaged in the lending business, disposing of a loan portfolio may be treated as disposing of a substantial part of an undertaking. The meaning of “undertaking”, which originated from the Industrial Disputes Act and was adopted in the Companies Act without being restricted to the meaning attributed to it under the Industrial Disputes Act, continues to have significance. This concept will remain dynamic and will have to be adapted as times change.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Conclusion</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Though the term “undertaking” emerged from the Industrial Disputes Act, judicial pronouncements have made it contemporary even in the modern business world, where different forms of businesses have emerged.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Explanation of undertaking starts with the word ‘Undertaking shall mean an undertaking in which investment of the company exceeds 20%’, and therefore this explanation adopts the meaning of undertaking which emerged from judicial pronouncements, it just adds some threshold in case company has multiple business units.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Though an explanation was added for “substantially the whole of the undertaking”, it is still to be tested judicially. The Bombay High Court took the view that “substantially the whole of an undertaking” means a significant part of the undertaking without which the residual undertaking becomes a husk. However, pursuant to the JJ Irani Committee recommendation and the explanation added to section 180, the meaning of “substantially the whole” has become rule-based, and corporates need to be mindful of it.</p>



<hr class="wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity"/>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><a href="#_ednref1" id="_edn1">[i]</a> Sub-section(1) of section 180</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><a href="#_ednref2" id="_edn2">[ii]</a> <em>Secretary, Madras Gymkhana Club Employees’ Union</em> v <em>Management of the Gymkhana Club</em> AIR 1968 SC 554 (563). [Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, section 2(<em>i</em>) &amp; (<em>v</em>)]</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><a href="#_ednref3" id="_edn3">[iii]</a> <em>Yallamma Cotton, Woollen &amp; Silk Mills Co Ltd</em>, <em>In re</em> (1970) 40 Comp Cas 466 (Mys).</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><a href="#_ednref4" id="_edn4">[iv]</a> P S Offshore Inter Land Services Pvt. Ltd. And Anr. Vs. Bombay Offshore Suppliers Ltd. and Ors: 1991 SCC OnLine Bom 555, (Bombay HC)</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><a href="#_ednref5" id="_edn5">[v]</a> <em>Pramod Kumar Mittal</em> v <em>Andhra Steel Corpn Ltd</em> (1985) 58 Comp Cas 772 (Cal)</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><a href="#_ednref6" id="_edn6">[vi]</a> [2025] 257 Comp Cas 91 (NCLT)</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><a href="#_ednref7" id="_edn7">[vii]</a> 1994) 13 CLA 391 (Bom): (1994) 79 Comp Cas 346 (Bom).</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><a href="#_ednref8" id="_edn8">[viii]</a> Appeal No. 207 of 2010 dated 18.11.2011</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The article is written by the Founder Partner Mr. Makarand M. Joshi.</strong></p><p>The post <a href="https://mmjc.in/what-is-the-meaning-of-undertaking-and-substantially-the-whole-undertaking-under-the-companies-act/">What is the meaning of “undertaking” and “substantially the whole undertaking” under the Companies Act?</a> first appeared on <a href="https://mmjc.in">MMJC</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
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		<title>The Notice Nobody Wants: Lessons from RBI Penalty Orders</title>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>A Case-Based Analysis of Enforcement Orders, and the Role of Independent Compliance Audit 1.Introduction Whenever the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) penalises a Non-Banking Financial Company (NBFC), the news usually reports only the headline number, such as “a fine of a few lakh rupees” or “new lending stopped”. What matters more to a Company Secretary [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://mmjc.in/the-notice-nobody-wants-lessons-from-rbi-penalty-orders/">The Notice Nobody Wants: Lessons from RBI Penalty Orders</a> first appeared on <a href="https://mmjc.in">MMJC</a>.</p>]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong><u>A Case-Based Analysis of Enforcement Orders, and the Role of Independent Compliance Audit</u></strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>1</strong>.<strong>Introduction</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Whenever the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) penalises a Non-Banking Financial Company (NBFC), the news usually reports only the headline number, such as “a fine of a few lakh rupees” or “new lending stopped”. What matters more to a Company Secretary or a governance professional is the paragraph in the order that explains how the regulator found the gap. That paragraph raises a simple question: would the company&#8217;s own audit programme or internal checks have found this gap first? If not, it is a warning for the company and for its auditors.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">That question has become sharper since RBI rebuilt its supervision around the Scale Based Regulation (SBR) Framework, 2023 (as amended in November 2025), and gave its Enforcement Department (EFD) a cleaner separation from day-to-day supervision. The Enforcement Department acts under Section 58G read with Section 58B of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934, and, where credit bureau data is involved, under the Credit Information Companies (Regulation) Act, 2005. The law has not changed. What has changed is the way gaps are detected: RBI now reads the data, not only the files.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>What is happening now.</strong> This question is very current. In a single month in 2026, RBI issued penalty orders against six NBFCs within ten days, mainly for lapses related to: customer risk reviews not done on time, accounts not classified as non-performing assets (NPAs), exposure limits crossed, and directors holding too many board positions. Again in 2026, five more NBFCs were penalised in a single week. None of the basic lapses needs advanced technology to find; each needs only a regular, independent check.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>2.How RBI Finds These Gaps</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">RBI mainly uses the three methods below to find these gaps:</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>First, through offsite supervision</strong> &#8211; RBI&#8217;s Centralised Information Management System (CIMS) collects the regulatory returns filed by NBFCs and analyses them automatically. It identifies unusual lending rates (Weighted Average Lending Rate), missing disclosures, and high exposure to specific borrowers or sectors. As a result, RBI may identify possible problems even before an inspection begins.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Second, through onsite inspection</strong> &#8211; During the annual inspection, RBI officers review board minutes, Know Your Customer (KYC) records, information technology (IT) logs, customer files and other documents. The inspection checks whether the NBFC has followed the regulatory requirements.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Third, through a Control Gap Assessment &#8211;</strong> This is a focused and quicker review of one specific risk area. RBI starts it whenever offsite data points to a possible concern, whatever the annual inspection schedule says.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>3.Four Years of Enforcement Data</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>RBI&#8217;s Annual Reports publish enforcement data by type of Regulated Entity. NBFCs face a larger share of the most serious actions, such as restrictions on business operations. These restrictions are often harsher than monetary penalties, but they are not included in the penalty amounts shown in the table below.</strong></p>



<figure class="wp-block-table"><table class="has-fixed-layout"><tbody><tr><td><strong>Financial Year</strong></td><td><strong>Number of Actions Taken on NBFCs</strong></td><td><strong>NBFC Penalty (crore)</strong></td></tr><tr><td>2022-23</td><td>11</td><td>4.39</td></tr><tr><td>2023-24</td><td>22</td><td>11.53</td></tr><tr><td>2024-25</td><td>37*</td><td>7.29*</td></tr><tr><td>2025-26</td><td>25</td><td>1.76</td></tr></tbody></table></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">*The figure for 2024-25 (37 actions and INR 7.29 crore) is reported jointly for NBFCs and Asset Reconstruction Companies.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">RBI&#8217;s Annual Report for 2025-26 also shows how enforcement works in practice. Across all regulated entities (banks, co-operative banks and NBFCs), RBI issued 342 show-cause notices containing 698 charges. Only 382 charges led to monetary penalties. No enforcement action was taken on the remaining 316 charges, after the entities had replied to the notices and, where needed, been heard in person.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This shows that good compliance records and proper documentation make a real difference. An NBFC that keeps its records in order from the beginning is in a much stronger position to answer a regulatory notice. This is why strong governance in NBFCs is important.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">It also shows that RBI looks more closely at larger NBFCs. Upper Layer and Middle Layer NBFCs should expect closer scrutiny. Accordingly, an NBFC&#8217;s audit should be based on its size and risk, and the same checklist should not be used for every company, every time.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>4.The Four Enforcement Orders</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Case 1</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In a recent enforcement action, RBI directed an NBFC to stop sanctioning and disbursing gold loans, and to stop assigning, securitising or selling its gold loans, with immediate effect. The action followed an inspection based on the company&#8217;s position at the time. RBI found serious problems, including wrong assessment of the purity and weight of the pledged gold, loans above the permitted loan-to-value (LTV) limit, cash loan disbursals and collections far above the legal limit, failure to follow the standard auction process, and lack of transparency in the charges levied on customers.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Gold loans were a major part of the company&#8217;s business, at about one-third of its total loans. Since the concerns were serious, RBI imposed business restrictions instead of only a monetary penalty. A special audit followed, and the restrictions remained for several months, during which the company&#8217;s gold loan portfolio reduced significantly. Later, an inspection based on the company&#8217;s position at that time found that surplus money from gold auctions had not been returned to some borrowers, and RBI imposed a further penalty.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">What should have been in place?</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Automatic monitoring of LTV limits at every branch.</li>



<li>Approval controls for cash disbursals above INR 20,000.</li>



<li>A clear process for gold auctions, including timely return of surplus money to borrowers.</li>



<li>Regular independent checks of gold valuation.</li>



<li>Sample checks of loan files to confirm compliance with LTV limits.</li>



<li>Matching of auction records with the refunds actually paid to borrowers, using bank transfer details.</li>



<li>Checks that loans were paid through banking channels and not in cash beyond the permitted limit.</li>
</ul>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Case 2</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In another enforcement action, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) imposed a monetary penalty on an NBFC for non-compliance with certain requirements of the KYC Directions. The company had not verified customers&#8217; Permanent Account Numbers (PAN) through the official verification facility of the Income Tax Department, and it had given more than one Unique Customer Identification Code (UCIC) to the same customer.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">These may look like small lapses, but RBI treats them seriously. Simply collecting a copy of the PAN card is not enough; it must be verified. Similarly, when one customer has several UCICs, it becomes difficult to see all of that customer&#8217;s transactions together and to detect money laundering risks.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">RBI has also penalised NBFCs for lapses in gold loan operations, including failure to refund surplus amounts realised from gold auctions to borrowers. Similarly, KYC non-compliance has continued to attract regulatory penalties, with several NBFCs facing enforcement action during 2026.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">What should have been in place?</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>PAN verification through the official portal before opening an account.</li>



<li>A system to prevent duplicate UCICs for the same customer.</li>
</ul>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Case 3</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In recent years, RBI has also imposed penalties on NBFCs for non-compliance with the Master Direction on Information Technology Framework for the NBFC Sector and with cyber security directions. The penalty followed a Control Gap Assessment, conducted by RBI, which focused on the company&#8217;s IT and information security controls.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">RBI found three main issues:</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>The company did not make sure that its outsourced vendor contracts included provisions for monitoring and oversight.</li>



<li>The company had not conducted an Information Security (IS) Audit of its network and security systems since they were put in place.</li>



<li>Although the company&#8217;s security system detected malware on a server and raised an alert, no action was taken. The company also did not store email security logs properly.</li>
</ul>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The most important point is that the security system worked and detected the problem. The failure was that the company did not act on the alert. RBI treated this as a governance failure, not a technology failure.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This case also shows that RBI can conduct a Control Gap Assessment at any time, separately from the annual inspection.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">What should have been in place?</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Standard IT outsourcing agreements with audit rights and RBI access clauses.</li>



<li>Annual Information Security Audits, with reports placed before the Audit Committee.</li>



<li>A system to monitor security alerts, retain logs, and ensure timely action.</li>
</ul>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Case 4</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">RBI has increasingly focused on IT governance and cyber security compliance among NBFCs, imposing penalties for lapses in managing risks and code of conduct in outsourcing of financial services. In a recent RBI enforcement, the penalty followed a statutory inspection with reference to the company&#8217;s financial position at the time and focused on outsourcing conduct and fair lending practices.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The RBI found two issues:</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>The company did not make sure that its recovery agents avoided harassment and intimidation of customers during debt collection.</li>



<li>Customers made persistent and repeat complaints about harassment caused by the company&#8217;s recovery and collection methods.</li>
</ul>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The key point is that the complaints were <strong>not one-time incidents</strong>. They kept happening. RBI used the words <strong>“persistent/repeat”,</strong> which means the company either did not notice the problem or did not fix it, even though it continued. RBI treated this as a failure of management and oversight, not just an everyday operational issue.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This case also shows that <strong>outsourcing does not remove an NBFC&#8217;s responsibility</strong>. Even when recovery work is given to an outside agency, the NBFC remains responsible for how that agency&#8217;s recovery agents behave.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On 6 August 2026, RBI issued final directions on the recovery of loan dues and the engagement of recovery agents, which apply to NBFCs, banks and other lenders from 1 January 2027. Among other things, they require a written recovery policy, recovery agents certified by the Indian Institute of Banking and Finance, and call recording. What RBI penalised earlier is now being written into the rulebook.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>What should the company have done?</strong></p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Make sure contracts with recovery agents clearly prohibit harassment and allow the company to audit the agency or end the contract if the rules are broken.</li>



<li>Have a system to identify repeated complaints, escalate them, and report them to the compliance team or senior management.</li>



<li>Check the behaviour of recovery agents regularly by reviewing call recordings, training records and customer complaints, instead of judging them only by how much they recover.</li>
</ul>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>5. Where an Independent Compliance Audit Can Help Find These Gaps</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The table below places the four cases side by side. For each case, it shows the violation, how RBI found it, and where an independent compliance audit could have found the gap before RBI did.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-table"><table class="has-fixed-layout"><tbody><tr><td><strong>Case</strong></td><td><strong>Core Violation</strong></td><td><strong>How RBI Found It</strong></td><td><strong>Where an Independent Compliance Audit Would Have Caught It</strong></td></tr><tr><td><strong>Case 1</strong></td><td>Wrong assessment of gold purity and weight, breaches of the loan-to-value (LTV) limit, cash disbursals above the legal limit, and a broken auction and refund process.</td><td>Regular RBI supervisory inspection (position at inspection date). RBI found serious concerns in the gold loan portfolio and, using its powers under Section 45L(1)(b) of the RBI Act, restricted new gold loans.</td><td>Sample testing of gold loan files for LTV and valuation; branch-wise reports of cash disbursals; matching of auction proceeds with refunds paid to borrowers; independent review of gold valuers.</td></tr><tr><td><strong>Case 2</strong></td><td>PAN not verified through the official Income Tax portal; same customer given multiple UCICs</td><td>Routine RBI inspection of Know Your Customer (KYC) and anti-money laundering compliance</td><td>Sample check of new customer files for evidence of PAN verification; system report of customers holding more than one UCIC; test of the controls in the customer onboarding system.</td></tr><tr><td><strong>Case 3</strong></td><td>Vendor contracts missing audit and oversight clauses, no Information Security (IS) audit since the systems went live, and a malware alert that was never acted on</td><td>RBI&#8217;s Control Gap Assessment, a targeted review that RBI can start at any time, separate from the annual inspection cycle</td><td>Review of vendor contracts for audit and oversight clauses; check that an IS audit has been done and placed before the Audit Committee; review of how security alerts are logged, assigned and closed.</td></tr><tr><td><strong>Case 4</strong></td><td>Recovery agents harassing borrowers; complaints were persistent and repeated, not one time activity</td><td>Statutory RBI inspection reviewing outsourcing conduct and adherence to the Fair Practices Code</td><td>Review of recovery agent contracts; analysis of complaints by agent and branch; sample review of call recordings and training records; reporting of repeat complaints to senior management.</td></tr></tbody></table></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Pattern across all four:</strong> In all four cases, the problem was not a one-time mistake. It was the lack of regular independent checks to ensure that the NBFC was following RBI requirements. RBI identified these issues during its inspections, which happen only from time to time. A regular independent compliance audit can help NBFCs identify and correct such gaps before RBI points them out. This is why NBFCs should not depend only on RBI inspections to identify compliance issues.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>6. Conclusion</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The four cases above carry one common message: <strong>regulatory issues rarely appear suddenly. They usually exist in the company&#8217;s own systems, records and processes long before RBI identifies them.</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The role of a compliance audit is therefore not limited to checking whether documents exist. A meaningful audit tests whether controls actually work on the ground. It finds gaps before they become regulatory observations and helps the Board take corrective action in time.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">RBI&#8217;s enforcement approach also shows that compliance is not only about avoiding penalties. A well-kept compliance framework, supported by proper documentation and timely corrective action, can strongly influence the outcome of regulatory proceedings. The fact that no action was taken on 316 of 698 charges in 2025-26, after the entities had replied, suggests how important it is to hold strong evidence of compliance.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For NBFCs, the message is clear: do not build compliance records after an RBI notice arrives. Build them every day as part of business operations.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The best defence against regulatory action is not a strong reply to an RBI notice. It is a strong compliance culture that makes sure the notice never arrives.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Bibliography</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">1. Reserve Bank of India, Annual Report 2022-23</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">2. Reserve Bank of India, Annual Report 2023-24</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">3. Reserve Bank of India, Annual Report 2024-25</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">4. Reserve Bank of India, Annual Report 2025-26</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">5. Reserve Bank of India, Press Releases</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">6. Reserve Bank of India, Non-Banking Financial Companies – Responsible Business Conduct Third Amendment Directions, 2026</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Disclaimer:</strong> References are based on RBI&#8217;s public releases and reports and are included for knowledge-sharing purposes only. No opinion is expressed on the overall conduct of any of the Companies.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The article is written by Mr. Ashok Pathak.</strong></p><p>The post <a href="https://mmjc.in/the-notice-nobody-wants-lessons-from-rbi-penalty-orders/">The Notice Nobody Wants: Lessons from RBI Penalty Orders</a> first appeared on <a href="https://mmjc.in">MMJC</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
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		<title>When Lending Turns Unfair: How Fair Practices Code Lapses Can Trigger RBI Action</title>
		<link>https://mmjc.in/when-lending-turns-unfair-how-fair-practices-code-lapses-can-trigger-rbi-action/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=when-lending-turns-unfair-how-fair-practices-code-lapses-can-trigger-rbi-action</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mmjc]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 12 Nov 2026 05:49:21 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Knowledge Hub]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[NBFC]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Newsletter]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://mmjc.in/?p=11744</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>There is a common misconception in the NBFC sector that the Fair Practices Code (FPC) is merely a policy document that needs to be approved by the Board and uploaded on the Company&#8217;s website. But is that what RBI really expects? Certainly not. The FPC is about how an NBFC treats its borrowers throughout the [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://mmjc.in/when-lending-turns-unfair-how-fair-practices-code-lapses-can-trigger-rbi-action/">When Lending Turns Unfair: How Fair Practices Code Lapses Can Trigger RBI Action</a> first appeared on <a href="https://mmjc.in">MMJC</a>.</p>]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p class="wp-block-paragraph">There is a common misconception in the NBFC sector that the Fair Practices Code (FPC) is merely a policy document that needs to be approved by the Board and uploaded on the Company&#8217;s website.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">But is that what RBI really expects? Certainly not.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The FPC is about how an NBFC treats its borrowers throughout the lending relationship, from loan application and sanction to documentation, disbursement, recovery and grievance redressal.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The RBI itself has described consumer protection as one of the two broad regulatory objectives of the NBFC framework, alongside financial-system stability. It specifically identifies the FPC as part of the conduct-of-business regulation designed to protect customers.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">When RBI issued a show cause notice to the Company for non-compliances, the main question arises whether the Company had treated its borrower fairly and transparently?</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">To answer this question, Company need to show case its transparent lending practices, fair dealing with the customers and rights to hear in case of deficiency.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This imbalance between the lender and borrower is not new, the power gap is existing from a long.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">When the Indian Contract Act was enacted in 1872, long before the RBI existed and NBFC term coined, before anyone wrote a Fair Practices Code — Sections 172 to 176 already imposed a duty on a pawnee to give reasonable notice before selling pledged goods. Which the FPC now says: a lender in possession of a borrower&#8217;s collateral holds a position of significant power, and that power carries a corresponding duty of fair dealing.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">From then to now, the scale of operation has changed, NBFC now have, technology, legal/operational/collection team and expertise in running the business. The borrower on the other hand gets a KFS, a sanction letter, most important terms and conditions and a repayment schedule, and there is no mechanism by which the borrower can check the calculation with the disclosure made in the document with the lenders system.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In September 2006, the Fair Practices Code (FPC) was introduced through RBI guidelines and required every NBFC to adopt a Board-approved FPC.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In March 2012, RBI issued revised FPC guidelines in supersession of the 2006 circular.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">RBI continued this approach through its Master Circulars (including 2015), the 2022 Digital Lending Guidelines, the 2023–24 requirements on penal charges, Key Facts Statements and interest charging, and the November 2025 Responsible Business Conduct Directions. The objective is to ensure that NBFCs deal with customers fairly, transparently and responsibly.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Consumer protection law was protecting borrowers a long before RBI introduced specific monetary penalties for FPC violations</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The concept of an “unfair trade practice” was introduced through the 1984 amendment to the MRTP Act, 1969 and was later carried forward into the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. Today, Section 2(47) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 covers practices such as misleading price representations and deceptive descriptions of services.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">So, if an NBFC misrepresents loan pricing to a borrower, it may not only violate RBI requirements but may also amount to an unfair trade practice under consumer law</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In one of the cases, where the vehicle was allegedly repossessed by force, rather than through lawful legal process. The matter was dealt with as a “deficiency in service” before the consumer forum and later moved to the Supreme court, rather than as an RBI enforcement action.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">An NBFC can face two separate consequences: regulatory action by RBI for violating its directions and consumer proceedings for deficiency in service or unfair trade practices. These are parallel remedies and can arise from the same conduct.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Major Area for the enforcement of risk.</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Interest and Charges: Transparency Throughout the Loan</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">RBI does not prescribe the rate of interest to be charged for the loan; however, it should not be excessive. An NBFC is free to price risk commercially. The problem arises when customers cannot clearly understand what they are being charged and why.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">RBI&#8217;s April 2024 circular on interest-charging practices identified issues such as charging interest from the date of sanction instead of actual disbursement, charging a full month&#8217;s interest for a part-month, and collecting advance instalments while calculating interest on the full loan amount. As per the RBI these are the system level problems and not the isolated issues.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The lesson is simple: if the company&#8217;s LMS is wrongly configured, the same mistake can affect thousands of customers.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Recovery Conduct: The Most Serious and Frequent FPC Risk</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This is the most common reason for the RBI Enforcements orders passed in previous years, to introduce separate amendments dealing with the engagement of recovery agents.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">RBI treats “repeat complaints” seriously. Repeated violations can turn an initial finding into a case of continued non-compliance and may result in stronger regulatory action.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The basic principle is that if a lender has the right to recover its money, but it cannot use any method it wants to recover it.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Recovery practices are risky because a single abusive call may create legal exposure under four different Acts, however consequences may vary on a case-to-case basis.</p>



<ol start="1" style="list-style-type:lower-roman" class="wp-block-list">
<li>RBI: Action for violation of the Responsible Business Conduct Directions, 2025.</li>



<li>Consumer law: A borrower may approach the Consumer Commission for deficiency in service under the Consumer Protection Act, 2019.</li>



<li>Criminal law: Threatening or intimidating a borrower may attract criminal liability under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.</li>



<li>Data protection: Using a borrower&#8217;s phone contacts to identify or pressure family members may create issues under the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023.</li>
</ol>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">These laws may be handled separately from a compliance perspective, but the risk arises from the same incident.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Also, outsourcing recovery does not mean outsourcing the NBFC&#8217;s responsibility. RBI can still examine how the recovery agent was selected, what due diligence was done, what training was provided, how the agent was monitored, and how complaints were handled.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Grievance Redressal: A Growing FPC Risk</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Till now the Grievance redressal has resulted in fewer FPC enforcement actions. However, it is now becoming a fast-growing area of regulatory concern.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Integrated Ombudsman Scheme, 2021 has given RBI greater visibility into customer complaints through external channels such as the RBI Complaint Management System, in addition to the complaints recorded internally by an NBFC.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">If the complaints reported by an NBFC do not match the complaints received through RBI&#8217;s channels, RBI may view this as under-reporting, which can become a governance issue rather than merely a customer-service issue.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">RBI Regulatory observations have highlighted the importance of accurate reporting and proper handling of customer complaints. NBFCs must ensure that complaint-related information is correctly disclosed in their Annual Financial Statements and that complaints rejected fully or partly by the internal grievance redressal mechanism are referred to the Internal Ombudsman, wherever required.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Therefore, the complaints are not just cases to be closed; they are important data.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For example: If 100 customers complain about the same incorrect foreclosure charge, it may indicate a system or process problem, rather than 100 separate customer-service issues.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A strong compliance function should therefore not simply respond to and close complaints. It should track common patterns, identify the root cause, take corrective action and report significant issues to the Board or relevant committees.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This approach can help during RBI inspections and prevent similar issues from recurring.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>How RBI Identifies FPC Violations</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The policy can be board approved but RBI inspection starts with the practical approach in FPC compliances</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">RBI starts with the company&#8217;s financial and transaction data for a particular period and then traces actual customer transactions and processes.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The RBI may check the below to identify the gaps:</p>



<ol class="wp-block-list">
<li>Compare loan files with the Key Facts Statement and sanction letter;</li>



<li>Check whether the interest actually charged matches what was disclosed;</li>



<li>Review recovery call records against the company&#8217;s recovery policy and code of conduct;</li>



<li>Check whether complaints were properly escalated to the Internal Ombudsman; and</li>



<li>Compare the company&#8217;s internal complaint records with complaints received through RBI&#8217;s external systems.</li>



<li>Can compare whether the charges levied are disclosed/informed to the customer while sanctioning the loan and it is understood by the borrower as well.</li>
</ol>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A violation can leave a data trail that RBI can identify, such as differences between the sanction date and disbursement date, the interest rate disclosed and the rate actually charged, or the recovery standards stated in the policy and the actual conduct of the recovery agent.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This is where the risk arises, the policy is saying one thing while the same is not aligned in the system and the operational staff is doing something else.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The April 2024 RBI circular on interest-charging practices is an example of how such system-level issues can be identified through supervisory examination, where the RBI illustrates how they find gaps at the time of the inspections.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Why an RBI penalty is only part of the risk</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">RBI enforcement is generally judged by the amount of the monetary penalty. However, the regulatory finding may have wider consequences, including closer monitoring, additional remediation and delays in regulatory approvals.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The escalation can be significant. For example, in past years, RBI directed certain NBFCs to stop sanctioning and disbursing fresh loans due to concerns over their pricing and income-assessment practices. This shows that RBI action can go beyond a financial penalty and directly affect the company&#8217;s ability to continue its business.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>What a NBFC should identify when FPC is violated</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The NBFC should ask five basic questions:</p>



<ol start="1" style="list-style-type:lower-roman" class="wp-block-list">
<li>Is it an isolated error or a system problem?<br>One incorrect account may be an operational error. The same error occurring again and again, reflect control failure.</li>



<li>Where did the problem originate?<br>It may arise from the policy, product design, system configuration, employee training, vendor supervision etc.</li>



<li>Has the customer suffered financial loss?<br>If yes, correcting the process for the future may not be enough. The affected customer may also need a reversal or refund.</li>



<li>What will prevent the problem from happening again?<br>System-based controls and automated checks are generally more reliable than controls that depend only on individual judgment.</li>



<li>Has the Board received the complete picture?<br>This is to be reflected in the board agenda, minutes and the parameter which the board had taken in consideration to analyse and resolve the issue</li>
</ol>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A strong FPC framework should therefore combine policy testing, transaction sampling, system checks, complaint analysis, vendor monitoring and customer review. The objective is not merely to complete a checklist but to identify and control the actual risk.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The Real Purpose of the FPC</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">At its core, the Fair Practices Code asks a simple question? Is the customer actually being treated fairly throughout the lending relationship?</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This includes everything from the interest charged and fees collected to the recovery call and handling of complaints, the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 and the RBI Act, 1934 together reflect a broader principle: a borrower&#8217;s vulnerability cannot simply be treated as a business opportunity.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">FPC compliance is therefore not about doing borrowers a favour. It is about ensuring that the NBFC&#8217;s systems, employees, agents and processes deliver the fair treatment required by law.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The real test of FPC compliance is how the NBFC charges EMIs and interest, manages recovery and treats customers when they raise complaints.</p>



<hr class="wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity"/>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><a href="#_ftnref1" id="_ftn1">[1]</a> Functions and Working of RBI</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><a href="#_ftnref2" id="_ftn2">[2]</a> Indian Contract Act, 1872</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><a id="_ftn3" href="#_ftnref3">[3]</a> DoS.CO.PPG.SEC.1/11.01.005/2024-25<strong>the OFS.</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The article is written by Mr. Ashok Pathak.</strong></p><p>The post <a href="https://mmjc.in/when-lending-turns-unfair-how-fair-practices-code-lapses-can-trigger-rbi-action/">When Lending Turns Unfair: How Fair Practices Code Lapses Can Trigger RBI Action</a> first appeared on <a href="https://mmjc.in">MMJC</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
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		<title>A Shorter Wait to Sell: SEBI Eases cooling off period requirement under OFS Norms for Privately Listed InvITs</title>
		<link>https://mmjc.in/a-shorter-wait-to-sell-sebi-eases-cooling-off-period-requirement-under-ofs-norms-for-privately-listed-invits/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=a-shorter-wait-to-sell-sebi-eases-cooling-off-period-requirement-under-ofs-norms-for-privately-listed-invits</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mmjc]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 12 Nov 2026 05:07:52 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Invit]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Knowledge Hub]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Newsletter]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://mmjc.in/?p=11737</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Background The Offer for Sale (OFS) framework allows shares and units of REITs and InvITs to be sold through stock exchanges, subject to certain conditions. One such condition is a cooling-off period that restricts purchases and sales before and after an OFS, depending on the liquidity of the securities. This framework is set out in [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://mmjc.in/a-shorter-wait-to-sell-sebi-eases-cooling-off-period-requirement-under-ofs-norms-for-privately-listed-invits/">A Shorter Wait to Sell: SEBI Eases cooling off period requirement under OFS Norms for Privately Listed InvITs</a> first appeared on <a href="https://mmjc.in">MMJC</a>.</p>]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Background</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Offer for Sale (OFS) framework allows shares and units of REITs and InvITs to be sold through stock exchanges, subject to certain conditions. One such condition is a cooling-off period that restricts purchases and sales before and after an OFS, depending on the liquidity of the securities. This framework is set out in SEBI’s Master Circular for Stock Exchanges and Clearing Corporations dated 30 December 2024. By its circular dated <strong>2 November 2026</strong>, SEBI has reduced this period for <strong>privately listed InvITs with illiquid units</strong> with immediate effect.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This article explains what the cooling-off period means, why it is linked to liquidity, and the reasons for this relaxation. It also examines how the shorter period may help investors plan exits and manage their holdings.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Understanding the Cooling-off Period</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A cooling-off period is a specified time before and after an OFS during which the seller must not otherwise buy or sell the same securities, subject to applicable exceptions. The general period is two weeks for most liquid securities, four weeks for liquid securities and twelve weeks for illiquid securities. For example, under the revised eight-week requirement, a unitholder selling illiquid privately listed InvIT units through OFS must ordinarily avoid other purchases or sales of those units for eight weeks before the offer and eight weeks after its closure.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This gap helps separate the OFS from the seller’s other transactions and supports fair price discovery. The link with liquidity is understandable: where trading is frequent, the market can generally absorb a transaction more easily; where trading is thin, even a relatively small transaction may significantly influence the price. A longer gap therefore provides greater separation in illiquid securities. SEBI identifies cooling-off as a safeguard for the OFS mechanism; this explanation of its connection with price impact is an interpretation of the framework.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>What Has Changed?</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The circular modifies <strong>paragraph 19.2 of Chapter 1</strong> of the Master Circular dated 30 December 2024 by introducing a specific cooling-off period for illiquid units of privately listed InvITs.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-table"><table class="has-fixed-layout"><thead><tr><td><strong>Particulars</strong></td><td><strong>Earlier requirement</strong></td><td><strong>Revised requirement</strong></td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Cooling-off period before the OFS</td><td>12 weeks</td><td>8 weeks</td></tr><tr><td>Cooling-off period after the OFS</td><td>12 weeks</td><td>8 weeks</td></tr><tr><td>Securities covered by this relaxation</td><td>Illiquid units of privately listed InvITs</td><td>Same category</td></tr></tbody></table></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The change reduces the restriction by <strong>four weeks on each side of the OFS</strong>. It is a targeted relaxation for illiquid privately listed InvIT units, rather than a general reduction for all REITs and InvITs. The circular continues to provide that retail-investor provisions do not apply to OFS transactions involving privately listed InvITs and that such offers remain open for one day.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Why Was the Period Reduced?</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The background appears in <strong>Section 6 of SEBI’s consultation paper dated 6 August 2026 on measures towards ease of doing business for REITs and InvITs</strong>. The paper noted that the ₹25 lakh trading lot applicable to privately listed InvITs creates structural liquidity constraints. Participation is consequently concentrated largely among institutional investors, body corporates and high-net-worth individuals, and trading volumes may remain thin. &nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Bharat InvITs Association represented that applying equity-oriented cooling-off timelines did not adequately recognise these structural constraints or the absence of retail participation. Taking these submissions and the recommendations of the Hybrid Securities Advisory Committee into account, SEBI proposed reducing the period from twelve to eight weeks to facilitate ease of doing business. The November circular implements that proposal.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Conclusion: Greater Flexibility for Investors</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The shorter period may make OFS a more practical exit route for existing unitholders. Where a recent transaction attracts the restriction, an investor may become eligible to undertake an OFS four weeks earlier and may also resume otherwise restricted dealings four weeks sooner after the offer, subject to other applicable requirements. This could help investors align stake sales with fund tenures, cash requirements and portfolio rebalancing.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">These are potential benefits, rather than assured outcomes. An OFS transfers existing units, with proceeds accruing to the seller; its immediate benefit is therefore greater flexibility for selling unitholders. Easier exits may also encourage investor interest in privately listed InvITs. However, sustained improvement in liquidity will still depend on willing buyers, pricing and market participation. <strong>The amendment makes transactions easier to plan, while retaining an eight-week safeguard on either side of the OFS.</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The article is written by Ms. Rutuja Umadikar</strong>.</p><p>The post <a href="https://mmjc.in/a-shorter-wait-to-sell-sebi-eases-cooling-off-period-requirement-under-ofs-norms-for-privately-listed-invits/">A Shorter Wait to Sell: SEBI Eases cooling off period requirement under OFS Norms for Privately Listed InvITs</a> first appeared on <a href="https://mmjc.in">MMJC</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
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		<title>Behind the Boardroom Table: The Stress We Don&#8217;t Talk About in Governance</title>
		<link>https://mmjc.in/behind-the-boardroom-table-the-stress-we-dont-talk-about-in-governance/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=behind-the-boardroom-table-the-stress-we-dont-talk-about-in-governance</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mmjc]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 05 Nov 2026 10:07:10 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Knowledge Hub]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Newsletter]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://mmjc.in/?p=11672</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>On Stress Awareness Day, a look at how pressure shapes judgement around the board table — and the disciplines that help A promoter hears an independent director’s question as an accusation and thinks: “Do they understand what it took to build this company?” The director, working from incomplete information, wonders: “How can I approve something [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://mmjc.in/behind-the-boardroom-table-the-stress-we-dont-talk-about-in-governance/">Behind the Boardroom Table: The Stress We Don’t Talk About in Governance</a> first appeared on <a href="https://mmjc.in">MMJC</a>.</p>]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>On Stress Awareness Day, a look at how pressure shapes judgement around the board table — and the disciplines that help</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A promoter hears an independent director’s question as an accusation and thinks: <em>“Do they understand what it took to build this company?”</em> The director, working from incomplete information, wonders: <em>“How can I approve something I cannot properly assess?”</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Both want the company to succeed. Yet each experiences the other’s behaviour as a threat.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>The agenda records the business issue. It rarely records the emotional weight behind it.</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Over the years, I have seen difficult boardroom conversations become harder when the issue at hand begins to feel personal.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Stress Awareness Day usually prompts conversations about workload, burnout and wellbeing. We talk far less about the pressure carried into rooms where consequential decisions are made. The boardroom is one of them. And once that pressure begins to shape judgement, information flow and behaviour, <strong>stress stops being only a wellbeing issue. It becomes a governance issue.</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Why the pressure becomes personal</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For many promoters, the company is identity, sacrifice, family security and legacy. A question about strategy can feel like a question about competence. Delegation can feel like losing relevance; succession, like displacement.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Independent directors carry a different weight: the expectation of independent judgement with limited operational visibility. They worry about missing warning signs, straining relationships by pressing too hard, or staking their reputation on misplaced trust.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Promoters may need recognition for what they have built. Independent directors may need information, candor and confidence that disagreement will be heard. Neither need is unreasonable. The trouble starts when these needs go unspoken and begin to steer decisions. The same dynamic plays out between a CEO and the board, a CFO and the audit committee, or a founder and the team being prepared for succession. Governance defines the roles; people still occupy them.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>How it spreads</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Take a proposal to support a struggling group company. The promoter sees employees, relationships and years of effort. The independent director sees exposure, conflicts and thin justification. Watching the standoff, employees hold back bad news, auditors start to look obstructive, and management shares less just as directors question more sharply. Unspoken anxiety becomes organisational behaviour.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Six disciplines for pressure in the boardroom</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Recognizing the pressure is only useful if it helps us respond differently. The aim is not a less demanding boardroom, but one where pressure does not distort judgement, communication and trust. Six practical disciplines can help.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>1.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Name the emotion before debating the decision.</strong> Before a difficult meeting, ask: “Am I concerned about the proposal, or do I feel distrusted, excluded or exposed?” A promoter can acknowledge discomfort without rejecting scrutiny; a director can acknowledge uncertainty without assuming dishonesty.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>2.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Replace interpretations with specific questions.</strong> Not “You never trust management,” but “What information would help you assess this?” Not “Management is hiding something,” but “Which facts are missing, and when can we have them?” Specific questions make concerns actionable.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>3.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Respect the person while testing the proposal.</strong> A director might say: “I understand why this matters to you. Let us test whether the company can bear this exposure.” A promoter might reply: “Help us identify the safeguards that would make this acceptable.” Neither surrenders judgement.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>4.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Reduce avoidable uncertainty through process.</strong> Circulate papers early, explain assumptions, give access to the right executives and track open questions. Clear lines between board oversight and management execution spare everyone from renegotiating access and trust at every meeting.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>5.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Make room for disagreement before positions harden.</strong> The Chair should notice interruptions, silences and exchanges turning personal. A pause or a private conversation can restore perspective, but material concerns must always return to the board process.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>6.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Protect the capacity for sound judgement.</strong> Promoters should build leaders who can carry real responsibility; directors should ask whether their commitments leave time to prepare properly. Pressure follows people home, so recovery deserves attention too: time to switch off, rest, a candid conversation with someone trusted, and professional support when distress persists. Where stress is already showing, contain it: no angry messages, protection for those raising concerns, and facts verified before anything is communicated.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Vulnerability does not dilute accountability</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">None of this changes anyone’s responsibilities. Independent directors must still scrutinise management and pursue legitimate concerns. Promoters and management remain accountable for their conduct. Section 149(12) of the Companies Act limits the liability of independent and non-executive directors in defined circumstances; it is not immunity. Pressure is never an excuse for concealment or weak oversight.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">But good governance can hold two ideas at once: <strong>people remain accountable for their decisions, and the quality of those decisions depends on the conditions in which judgement is exercised.</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">That is the conversation worth having today. Not whether boardrooms should be less demanding, but whether we can build boardrooms where hard questions are asked without becoming personal, uncertainty can be admitted without looking like weakness, and challenge improves decisions instead of damaging relationships. <strong>A well-governed company makes room for human vulnerability while preserving institutional discipline.</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>POST COPY:</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In my years alongside boards, I&#8217;ve seen one workplace consistently left out of the stress conversation: the boardroom. With this year&#8217;s Stress Awareness Day theme being &#8220;Rehumanising the Workplace&#8221;, it felt right to bring it up.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A promoter hears a hard question as an accusation.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">An independent director fears the warning sign they might be missing.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Neither says it out loud.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The minutes record the decision. Never the pressure behind it.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">That&#8217;s when stress stops being a wellbeing issue and becomes a governance issue.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Six disciplines I&#8217;ve seen work, in the article below.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">If you sit on a Board, or regularly report to one: what helps keep difficult disagreement constructive when the stakes become personal?</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">And if this resonates, I would be interested in hearing your views and experiences.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p><p>The post <a href="https://mmjc.in/behind-the-boardroom-table-the-stress-we-dont-talk-about-in-governance/">Behind the Boardroom Table: The Stress We Don’t Talk About in Governance</a> first appeared on <a href="https://mmjc.in">MMJC</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
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		<title>After the Bell Rings! Post-listing compliances: What changes once a Company enters the stock market?</title>
		<link>https://mmjc.in/after-the-bell-rings-post-listing-compliances-what-changes-once-a-company-enters-the-stock-market/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=after-the-bell-rings-post-listing-compliances-what-changes-once-a-company-enters-the-stock-market</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mmjc]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 04 Nov 2026 07:14:45 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[IPOs]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Knowledge Hub]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Newsletter]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[SEBI - LODR]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://mmjc.in/?p=11658</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Listing equity shares completes the Initial Public Offering (IPO) but also begins the company’s continuing obligations under securities laws. While the IPO process focuses on approvals, offer-document disclosures and allotment, the post-listing phase requires ongoing regulatory filings, corporate governance compliance and timely communication of material information to stock exchanges and investors. These obligations arise at [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://mmjc.in/after-the-bell-rings-post-listing-compliances-what-changes-once-a-company-enters-the-stock-market/">After the Bell Rings! Post-listing compliances: What changes once a Company enters the stock market?</a> first appeared on <a href="https://mmjc.in">MMJC</a>.</p>]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Listing equity shares completes the Initial Public Offering (IPO) but also begins the company’s continuing obligations under securities laws. While the IPO process focuses on approvals, offer-document disclosures and allotment, the post-listing phase requires ongoing regulatory filings, corporate governance compliance and timely communication of material information to stock exchanges and investors.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">These obligations arise at different stages. Some disclosures are required on listing, certain formalities must follow immediately, and others become due with the first financial results or later reporting periods.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The post-listing compliance process can be examined across four stages.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Stage 1: On the listing date &#8211; Completing exchange formalities and initial disclosures</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>1.Stock-exchange credentials and filing access:</strong></p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>A company listed on NSE or BSE must submit regulatory filings through the prescribed electronic platforms. It should therefore obtain and activate access to the NSE Electronic Application Processing System (NEAPS) and BSE Listing Centre, as applicable.</li>



<li>For NSE, the designated user should confirm access to the compliance and corporate-announcement modules, including facilities for uploading prescribed PDF documents and XBRL returns. Access to BSE Listing Centre should likewise be verified for corporate announcements and compliance filings.</li>



<li>The company should verify that the authorised user’s email address and mobile number, the Company Secretary’s particulars, and all other registration details are accurate. Any discrepancy should be resolved through the relevant exchange’s registration or support process.</li>



<li>Exchange records should also contain the correct GSTIN for billing. The company should review and update its GSTIN master and billing details wherever necessary. These are administrative exchange requirements and are distinct from disclosures mandated by the LODR Regulations.</li>



<li>NSE and BSE also operate an API-based Single Filing System. For disclosures covered by this facility, a filing made on one exchange is transmitted to the other. The company should select the correct filing category, submit the required document and confirm successful dissemination, rather than assume that every filing is automatically covered.</li>
</ul>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>2</strong>.<strong>Disclosure of authorized KMP under Regulation 30(5) SEBI LODR regulations [“LODR”]:</strong> Immediately after listing, the company should disclose the authorized personnel’s names and contact details to the exchanges and publish them on its website. The Board must authorize one or more key managerial personnel for determining the materiality of events or information and making disclosures to the stock exchanges.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>3.Disclosure of code of fair disclosure under PIT Regulations [“PIT”]:</strong> The company should submit its Code of Fair Disclosure through the applicable corporate-announcement facility and make the code available on its website. Regulation 8(2) of the PIT requires a company whose securities are listed to promptly intimate its Code of Practices and Procedures for Fair Disclosure of UPSI, including amendments, to the stock exchanges.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>4.Website and investor grievance facilities:</strong> Reg. 46 (2) of LODR require listed entities to have a separate section on website for displaying information as is required by Reg. 46. Accordingly listed entity should activate an investor-relations section on its website carrying the content as per regulation 46.  </p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>5.Investor grievance mail id:</strong> The designated investor grievance email address should be operational, and access to SCORES and the applicable SMART ODR framework should be arranged in accordance with SEBI&#8217;s prescribed onboarding requirements. Complaints received through the website, email, RTA or regulatory platforms should be centrally recorded and assigned for resolution.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Stage 2: After listing &#8211; Updating records and implementing regulatory controls</strong></p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li><strong>Updating the CIN and MCA master data:</strong> After listing, the company should submit a Change Request Form (‘CRF’) on the MCA website to correct its CIN. A resolution of board of directors in this regard is mandatory for making an application of change request for CIN and MCA master data. Company should simultaneously update the CIN on its letterheads, website, communications and other documents.</li>



<li><strong>Post-listing declarations and disclosures:</strong> Upon listing, the Company should obtain requisite initial disclosures of securities holdings under Regulation 7(1)(b) of PIT, and disclosures of subsequent transactions under Regulation 7(2), wherever applicable.</li>



<li><strong>Designated-person information and declarations:</strong> Under Clause 14 of Schedule B of the PIT, designated persons are required to furnish prescribed information, including the names and PAN or other permitted identifiers of immediate relatives and persons with whom they share a material financial relationship, along with specified contact information.<br><strong>SAST disclosures and promoter information:</strong> SEBI, through its circular dated 07<sup>th</sup> March 2022, automated disclosures under Regulations 29 and 31 of the SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers) Regulations, 2011, through a mechanism involving depositories and stock exchanges, dispensing with separate manual filings for transactions covered by the framework.<br>Accordingly, upon listing, the company should ensure that the PAN details of its promoters and promoter-group members are correctly mapped with the designated depository and that subsequent changes are updated in accordance with the prescribed procedure. The company should also verify the system-generated disclosures disseminated by the stock exchanges and promptly report discrepancies. However, manual disclosures continue to be required in specified cases, including disclosure triggers arising from aggregate holdings of persons acting in concert or transactions not covered by the automated mechanism.</li>



<li><strong>Identify size-based obligations:</strong> It is recommended that the Companies should monitor market-capitalisation-based LODR requirements under Regulation 3(2) and examine pre-IPO employee benefit schemes under Regulation 12 of the SEBI (Share Based Employee Benefits and Sweat Equity) Regulations, 2021, including conformity and shareholder ratification before fresh grants.</li>
</ul>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Stage 3: First financial reporting cycle &#8211; Completing the first periodic filings</strong></p>



<ol class="wp-block-list">
<li><strong>Determining the first financial reporting period:</strong> Regulation 33(3)(j) of the LODR Regulations contains a specific relaxation for companies listed through an IPO.<br>The first financial results must cover the quarter or financial year immediately following the period for which financial statements were disclosed in the offer document. The filing deadline is the applicable period under Regulation 33(3)(a) or (d), or 21 days from listing, whichever is later. The company should therefore examine the financial statements included in its offer document, identify the next reporting period and calculate its first reporting deadline accordingly.<br>e.g. if a company got listed on October 28, 2026, then company will have to submit financial results for quarter ended September 2026 and any prior period within 21 days from listing or within 45 days from end of September 2026 (as results would be published for period of September 2026 and earlier if any). So, results will have to be published by November 18, 2026.</li>



<li><strong>Publication of financial results:</strong> Regulation 47 requires publication of the prescribed financial-results advertisement in an English national daily newspaper and a regional-language newspaper, subject to the applicable exemptions. Under the amended framework, the company must publish the prescribed advertisement with a QR code and details of the webpage hosting the complete financial results. Publishing the detailed results in the newspaper is optional. The company should arrange the advertisement after approval of the results, ensure compliance with the applicable publication timeline and retain the newspaper copies and proof of publication.</li>



<li><strong>Integrated Filing &#8211; Governance and Financial:</strong> Integrated Filing (Governance) includes the corporate governance compliance report, statement of investor grievances and the additional disclosures prescribed under the integrated format. It is generally due within 30 days after the quarter-end. Integrated Filing (Financial) covers financial results, statements of deviation or variation in the use of issue proceeds, applicable related-party transaction disclosures, and other prescribed financial information. It is generally due within 45 days after the quarter-end and within 60 days for the last quarter or financial year, subject to specific provisions, including Regulation 33(3)(j).<br>Related-party transaction disclosures remain half-yearly in frequency even though they form part of the Integrated Filing (Financial) framework.<br>If a company is listed during a quarter but before the quarterly compliance filings are submitted, the applicable filings must be completed for the quarter in which the listing occurs.</li>



<li><strong>Trading restrictions and automated PAN freezing</strong>: SEBI’s circular dated 19 July 2023 extended automated PAN freezing at the security level to all listed companies in phases. From 1 October 2025, the framework applies to equity and equity-linked instruments of all listed entities. SEBI’s circular dated 21 April 2025 further extended automated freezing for financial-results closures to the immediate relatives of designated persons.<br>For a newly listed company, automated freezing begins on the first day of the second quarter following the quarter of listing. This operational timeline does not defer the underlying insider-trading restrictions, which apply from listing.<br>The mandatory automated PAN–ISIN freezing framework applies only to trading-window closure arising from declaration of financial results.</li>



<li><strong>Quarterly compliance – If an entity gets listed at the end of quarter</strong>: Regulation 31(1)(b) requires submission of the quarterly shareholding pattern within 21 days from the end of each quarter. The company should obtain the quarter-end beneficial-position and shareholding records from its RTA and depositories, reconcile the issued capital with dematerialised and physical holdings, verify shareholder classifications and submit the prescribed shareholding pattern. Separately, Regulation 76 of the SEBI (Depositories and Participants) Regulations, 2018 requires reconciliation of share capital by a qualified practising professional. The report is required within 30 days from the quarter-end and should reconcile issued capital, listed capital and shares held in dematerialised and physical form, together with the prescribed particulars. Company should also file certification under reg. 74(5) of SEBI (Depositories and Participants) Regulations, 2018 within the prescribed time stating demat of securities, if any done during the quarter.</li>



<li><strong>Monitoring IPO proceeds:</strong> The company must track the amount raised, utilisation against each object stated in the offer document, the unutilised balance, and any deviation or variation in use. Under Regulation 32 of LODR, the prescribed deviation or variation statement should be reviewed by the Audit Committee and submitted through the applicable Integrated Filing framework. Where a monitoring agency has been appointed under the ICDR Regulations, the company must obtain its reports at the prescribed intervals, place them before the Audit Committee and make the required stock-exchange disclosures.</li>
</ol>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Conclusion</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Post-listing compliance begins with immediate operational and disclosure requirements: activating exchange filing systems, making initial regulatory disclosures, and implementing trading restrictions. It then progresses to the first financial reporting cycle, followed by quarterly, annual and event-based obligations under securities laws. A newly listed company must clearly identify each filing, the person responsible for approving or submitting it, the filing platform, and the applicable deadline. A stage-wise compliance calendar covering these points can prevent omissions as the company transitions from an IPO issuer to a continuously regulated listed entity.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The listing bell rings once, but the compliance clock starts immediately.</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><a href="#_ednref1" id="_edn1">[i]</a> Disclosures under Regulation 7(2) of SEBI PIT are system-driven for Promoters, Promoter Group members, Directors and Designated Persons. Separate manual disclosures are not mandatory where the system-driven disclosure framework applies (SEBI Circular dated 13 August 2021). However, manual disclosures may still be required for transactions not covered by the automated mechanism.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The article is written by Ms. Radhika Varade</strong>.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p><p>The post <a href="https://mmjc.in/after-the-bell-rings-post-listing-compliances-what-changes-once-a-company-enters-the-stock-market/">After the Bell Rings! Post-listing compliances: What changes once a Company enters the stock market?</a> first appeared on <a href="https://mmjc.in">MMJC</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
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